Alleged Rape Victim Faces Supreme Court
Emotional Case Probes Unlikely Realm of States’ Rights
By Geraldine Sealey
ABCNEWS.com
Jan. 11 — When you hear Christy Brzonkala’s story, you don’t immediately think of interstate commerce.
But when the Supreme Court heard the former Virginia Polytechnic Institute and State University student’s case today, the looming legal debate was more about the constitutional principles of the commerce clause and states’ rights than the horrific crime she alleges happened during her freshman year.
Brzonkala says that in September 1994, within an hour of meeting Virginia Tech football players Antonio J. Morrison and James Landale Crawford, the two men pinned her down on a bed in her dormitory and took turns raping her.
Brzonkala eventually dropped out. The school judiciary board cleared Crawford of the alleged rape. Morrison was punished with a deferred suspension that allowed him to continue playing football.
Although no criminal charges were ever filed, Brzonkala sued her alleged attackers under a provision of the federal Violence Against Women Act. The men moved to dismiss the case and a federal district court sided with them, ruling that although Brzonkala had a claim, Congress did not have the constitutional authority to pass the law.
The 4th Circuit Court of Appeals later agreed with the lower court and struck down the provision.
Today, the Supreme Court justices also seemed skeptical about whether Congress had acted within its bounds of authority.
If victims of gender-motivated crimes can sue their attackers, it “would justify a federal remedy for alimony or child support,” said Justice Sandra Day O’Connor, who is considered a key vote on this case because of her dueling allegiances to both states’ rights and women’s rights. Does Rape Hurt the Economy?
The 1994 law — among other provisions — grants victims of rape, stalking and other “gender-motivated” crimes the power to file federal civil lawsuits against their alleged attackers.
In asserting its authority to provide such a remedy, Congress cited two constitutional principles. One was the commerce clause, which gives Congress the power to regulate interstate commerce.
Congress’ logic was that the widespread problem of violence against women could affect the economy, so it should have the power to regulate it.
Brzonkala and her powerful co-plaintiff, the U.S. government, argue that violence against women could ultimately affect interstate commerce by impeding the employment, travel, and other economic activity of the victims.
Gender-based violence is “one of the most persistent barriers to women’s equality and full participation in the economy,” Brzonkala attorney Julie Goldscheid told the court today.
But Justice Antonin Scalia said those effects were not unique to gender-motivated crimes. Goldscheid’s logic “would allow general federal criminal laws on all subjects because all crime affects interstate commerce,” Scalia said.
Morrison and Crawford’s attorneys also have argued that Congress was too creative with the commerce clause when it enacted the law.
Is the Legal System Gender-Biased?
Also at issue here is the Violence Against Women Act’s reliance on the equal protection clause of the 14th Amendment.
Brzonkala and the government argue that bias against women in the state criminal justice systems often denies victims of gender-motivated crimes such equal protection under the law. After all, 36 state attorneys general support the law and 18 gender-bias task forces commissioned by state supreme courts have acknowledged discrimination in the legal system. Also, 19 courts across the nation have upheld the law.
“Our hope is that women will continue to have a choice and some control and a remedy after they have been victims of violence,” Brzonkala attorney Martha Davis of the National Organization for Women’s Legal Defense and Education Fund said in an interview. “If they are met with bias and disdain in the system, women can have a cause of action.”
Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg, known for her women’s rights advocacy, suggested that the Violence Against Women Act could be considered such an “alternative remedy.”
Congress could be saying, “We aren’t taking over the states’ domain. We are just complementing what the states do,” Ginsburg said. “Why isn’t that satisfactory?”
The former football players’ attorneys deny there is a pervasive gender bias in the criminal justice system. And, they argue, Congress has no power to regulate private conduct under the equal protection clause, only state action.
But the crux of their argument is that Congress has simply gone too far.
Court Has Pared Down Federal Power
“The larger question here is do we want a federal government with unlimited power, or the more limited federal government the Founding Fathers had in mind?” says Curt Levey, director of legal and public affairs for the Center for Individual Rights, representing Crawford and Morrison.
In deciding against Brzonkala, the 4th Circuit Court of Appeals ruled last March that Congress had indeed stretched too far in contending that the threat of violence against women substantially affected interstate commerce. The court said Congress had no authority to regulate activities that have such an “attenuated and indirect relationship” with interstate commerce.
The Violence Against Women Act “simply cannot be reconciled with the principles of limited federal government upon which this nation is founded,” the court wrote in its decision.
Several Supreme Court justices are likely to agree. In recent cases that have pitted the power of the states against the federal government, the high court has sided with the states, albeit on close votes.
Today’s 5-4 decision that Congress exceeded its authority when it allowed federal lawsuits against the states under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967 is the latest example.
And in 1995, the Supreme Court struck down the Gun-Free School Zones Act — which bears similarities to the rape lawsuit statute — saying its terms were wrongly pegged to the commerce clause. In United States vs. Lopez, the court warned against piling “inference upon inference” in a manner that would “convert congressional authority under the commerce clause to a general police power of the sort retained by the states.”
If the Supreme Court lets the Violence Against Women Act stand, it will contradict Lopez and other several recent rulings — including today’s and three handed down last term — that have pared down federal powers.
But if it strikes the provision down, the high court would erase a popular statute that addresses a serious social problem. The court’s action here also could impact the fate of civil rights laws also based on the 14th Amendment.
The cases are Brzonkala vs. Morrison, No. 99-29 and the United States vs. Morrison, No. 99-5. A decision is expected by this summer.
A Lower Burden of ProofLike many rape victims, Christy Brzonkala did not report her alleged attack right away. She waited several months and in the end, did not pursue criminal charges against the two men she said gang-raped her.
But under a provision of the Violence Against Women Act of 1994, Brzonkala had another course of action: to sue in federal court.
In civil court, alleged victims face a lower burden of proof than in criminal courts, where the state must prove “beyond a reasonable doubt” that the defendants are guilty. In a civil claim, victims only need to prove a “preponderance of evidence” that the attack was more likely than not to have happened.
By filing a claim under the 1994 law, Brzonkala and other women in similar circumstances find another advantage along with a lower burden of proof. They do not have to rely on the criminal justice system, which many view as unresponsive to their claims.
One of the driving forces behind the passage of the Violence Against Women Act was the belief by many members of Congress that women too often faced bias in police stations and courtrooms when victims of gender-motivated crimes.
By providing a civil rights remedy in federal courts, Congress sought to give women another avenue to seek justice.
Under the law, victims can sue for compensatory damages — including lost income, costs of psychological distress, delays in professional development, and counseling costs — and punitive damages aimed at deterring future similar wrongdoing.